The Nord Stream transboundary submarine pipeline, significant for its impact on the EU energy policy, has been a heavily debated issue in the Baltic Sea region during the past decade. This is partly due to the concerns over the effects that the pipeline might have on the Baltic Sea as a particularly sensitive large marine ecosystem.
The course of the Nord Stream pipeline runs along the territorial seas of Russia, Germany and Denmark 11 and the EEZ of Sweden and Finland in addition to the EEZ of the three aforementioned states. 12 It was an advantage to the project that due to the narrowness of the Gulf of Finland, 13 the outer limit of the territorial sea of Finland and Estonia had been established with the aim to never reach closer than 3 nm to the maritime boundary between the two States.
14 Thereby the territorial sovereignty of either of the States in that area was excluded and instead a six-mile wide EEZ was created to maintain free passage. 15 
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The pipeline comprises of two lines: the planned commissioning of the first pipeline is in 2011, whereas the second line is due to start operating in 2012. 
13
The Gulf of Finland is a 285 nm long inlet which in many sections is less than 24 nm wide with bordering countries Russia to the East, Finland to the North, Estonia to the South.
14 Oude Elferink (n 10) 176. 
Article
This has a particular importance to the Nord Stream project as otherwise its construction would have been subject to the explicit consent of either of the coastal States and the respective domestic regulations. 16 Although it has been argued that the possibility of the closure of the Gulf of Finland may not be excluded, 17 it could take effect only if Estonia and Finland after prior 12 months notice would decide to broaden their territorial sea to 12 nm, thereby amending the 1996 agreement on the boundary line. 18 However, this is unlikely to happen as it would consequently in accordance with Art 2 of the LOSC, inter alia, cause the closure of the strategically important overflight route for Russian military aircraft en route to the Russian exclave Kaliningrad Oblast between Poland and Lithuania. 19 Therefore, free passage in the Gulf of Finland remains intact making it possible to lay submarine pipelines in the passageway of the 6 nm-wide EEZ subject to Part V and VI of the LOSC.
III.
The applicability of the concept of artificial installations and structures to submarine pipelines
In order to further specify the applicable legal regime for the Nord Stream pipeline it is important to note that Nord Stream, as a long-distance gas transmission pipeline, should be distinguished from the pipelines that constitute an integral part of offshore exploitation operations (intra or inter-field pipelines) for which a different legal regime applies.
20
Intra-field pipelines connect two or more installations within a geographically limited area, whereas inter-field pipelines connect installations in different States. 21 Importantly, both of them are part of the installation and thus fall under the scope of Articles 60 and 80 of the LOSC which relate to artificial islands, installations and structures.
Although 'installations' and 'structures' are undefined in the LOSC it is clear that according to the terms of Article 60(1)(b) they have to have an economic purpose; proposals to make all installations subject to Article 60 were rejected at UNCLOS III. 22 Thus, the terms 'installations' and 'structures' cover 'facilities to be constructed to take advantage of all economic resources in and on the seabed, and in and above the water column', 23 eg renewable power generation facilities, fish aggregation devices and pipelines which are integrally connected to the exploitation installations.
Nord Stream, however, has no direct significance for the exploitation of natural resources. Hence it falls outside the scope of Articles 60 and 80 of the LOSC and may not be regarded as an artificial installation or structure. Nevertheless, as a transit pipeline passing through maritime zones which fall under the jurisdiction of the Baltic Sea littoral States, its construction is governed to a great extent by the regime of public international law. 24 Subsequently, it needs to be considered whether the littoral States of the Baltic Sea, parties to the LOSC, have in their power the legal right of subjecting the laying of the Nord Stream pipeline in their EEZ to their permission.
IV. Coastal State's permission as a precondition for the laying of pipelines in its EEZ
Under Article 56(2) of the LOSC a coastal State in its EEZ 'shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention'. Therefore, the freedom to lay submarine pipelines provided in Article 58(1) and 79(1) of the LOSC may not be impeded. 25 However, Article 79(3) of the LOSC provides that: 'The delineation of the course for the laying of such pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal state.' This clearly provides a limitation on the freedom to lay submarine pipelines as it is subjected to the consent of a coastal State. It constitutes a right for a coastal State to influence the delineation process on its continental shelf, both inside and outside the limits of the EEZ but does not provide the coastal State with the right to prohibit in toto the laying of the pipeline. 16 Vinogradov (n 6) 276.
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I Gawlowicz and P Laski, 'Russian-German North Gas Pipeline However, subject to Article 192 of the LOSC States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.
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According to Article 56(1)(b) of the LOSC a coastal State has in its EEZ jurisdiction with regard to 'the protection and preservation of the marine environment'. Hence States have to take all necessary measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source in accordance with Therefore, under the LOSC States parties have the right, by implementing the necessary domestic legislation, not to grant a permit for the construction of a submarine pipeline in their EEZ or on their continental shelf if the former constitutes a hazard to the marine environment. 28 However, no international legal instrument is established that would provide standards for prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from pipelines. Thus, due to the lack of harmonised rules that would provide guidelines for States acting under Article 79(2) of the LOSC, it is a matter of interpretation whether the measures taken satisfy the threshold criterion of reasonableness in order to be lawful.
V.
Marine scientific research in the context of seabed studies on the pipeline route
In addition to the coastal State's right to deny a permit for the laying of a submarine pipeline in its EEZ it needs to be considered whether a coastal State has the right to withhold its consent in connection with projects that concern scientific investigations in its EEZ. In relation with the Nord Stream pipeline these projects are carried out in the context of surveying and assessing the marine environment in the Baltic Sea which is a precondition for, inter alia, conducting an EIA and surveying the suitability of the seabed for the laying of pipelines.
Firstly, the question whether such investigations may be classified as a marine scientific research under Part XIII of the LOSC has to be addressed. The LOSC does not provide a definition for marine scientific research. Thus, its scope has been subject to different interpretations. For example, it has been argued that:
[Seabed studies] must be viewed as an "internationally lawful use" of the sea related to the exercise of high-seas freedoms in the EEZ, such as those "associated with submarine cables and pipelines," as provided for in Article 58(2) UNCLOS.
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Accordingly it is suggested that research in the context of a right to lay pipelines should be distinguished from the general concept of marine scientific research as without the right to conduct seabed studies the freedom to lay pipelines cannot be carried out.
However, traditionally marine scientific research is understood as having the following meaning: '[A]ny form of scientific investigation, fundamental or applied, concerned with the marine environment, ie that has the marine environment as its object … [including] subsoil or seabed in the marine environment'. 30 Hence it essentially includes all forms of scientific investigations. 31 Moreover, it may be subdivided into four categories: physical oceanography, chemical oceanography, marine biology and, finally, marine geology and geophysics. 32 The marine environment studies in relation to the Nord Stream project may be classified as falling mostly under the latter category as they are primarily concerned with sediments and topography of the seabed, including its physical properties. Of particular importance in addressing the scope of marine scientific research is its distinction between 'fundamental' and 'applied' scientific research. In that regard:
The former refers to scientific research intended to add to the sum of human knowledge about the world, regardless of its application, whereas the latter refers to research undertaken primarily for specific practical purposes. Marine scientific research in principle covers both kinds of scientific research.
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Thus, applied scientific research includes physical seabed investigations carried out for, inter alia, military or commercial purposes, 34 eg the laying of submarine pipelines, even when it is conducted without the intent of publishing the results.
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Thus with due respect to differing views the present author maintains that scientific investigations carried out in the marine environment in the context of the freedom to lay pipelines should be regarded as applied scientific research which fall under the scope of Part XIII of the LOSC.
Subsequently, the question whether a coastal State has the right to deny a permit to foreign vessels to conduct marine scientific research in its EEZ is addressed in the form of an illustrative example of an incident in 2005 that occurred in connection with the Nord Stream project in the Estonian EEZ.
VI. The overriding rule of Article 246(2) LOSC in light of the Estonian-Russian incident in 2005
In 2005, allegedly illegal research in Estonia's EEZ was carried out by Russian vessels. The Russian ship Pjotr Kotsov was found by the Estonian Coast Guard conducting research without Estonia's prior authorisation and it neglected the orders given to it by the Coast Guard. 36 Russian officials afterwards confirmed its vessels' (Pjotr Kotsov and Jakov Smirnitski) research activities on the planned route of the Nord Stream pipeline. 37 However, they argued that as the research was conducted outside the territorial waters of Estonia it did not call for any authorisation. 38 Under Part XIII of the LOSC, the general right to conduct marine scientific research is provided in Article 238. This right is further confirmed in Article 242(1) of the LOSC which calls for international co-operation for peaceful purposes in this field. Additionally, Article 242(2) of the LOSC provides that States shall offer to other States a reasonable opportunity to obtain information which is necessary to prevent and control damage to the health and safety of persons and marine environment.
However, coastal States have under Article 56(1)(b)(ii) exclusive jurisdiction with regard to marine scientific research in their EEZ which is subject to specific rules set forth in Article 246 of the LOSC. Thus, Article 246(2) of the LOSC provides the 'overriding rule' 39 according to which marine scientific research in the EEZ and on the continental shelf is always subject to the consent of the coastal State. Hence under Part XIII of the LOSC the Russian vessels' marine scientific research activities in 2005, conducted in the Estonian EEZ, were in breach of the law of the sea as no prior consent from the Estonian authorities was sought. The Russian authorities' contention that the research activities in the Estonian EEZ were lawful as the vessels were situated outside the territorial sea of Estonia is in that regard not grounded.
In the next chapter, a coastal State's right to refuse permission to conduct marine scientific research in its EEZ is explored in the context of an incident between Estonia and Russia in 2007.
VII. Article 246(5) LOSC in view of the Estonian-Russian incident in 2007
The Article the Gulf of Finland for the possible re-routing of the pipeline due to geological and environmental considerations. 40 Hence the consortium requested permission from the Estonian authorities to conduct a seabed survey in the Estonian EEZ.
The government of Estonia rejected the application and the decision was not challenged by the States most interested in the project, ie Russia and Germany. Instead, they eventually received the consent from the government of Finland to use its EEZ for the pipeline route. 41 Nevertheless, the lawfulness of the Estonian government's decision should be analysed further in light of the LOSC.
Estonia's rejection of the Nord Stream consortium's application to conduct sub-sea surveys in its EEZ raises the question of whether its position was in conformity with Article 246(3) of the LOSC. It stipulates that coastal States shall, in normal circumstances, grant their consent for marine scientific research projects performed by other States in their EEZ or on their continental shelf and such consent shall not be delayed or denied unreasonably. In considering whether normal circumstances apply it has to be determined, inter alia, that the research activities 'do not relate to the seismic or other explorations ', 42 they are in accordance with the LOSC, for the benefit of mankind and for peaceful purposes, carried out with appropriate scientific methods and means, have due regard for the protection and preservation of the marine environment and do not interfere unjustifiably with other legitimate uses of the sea. . 44 The distinction between exploration activities, 45 for which a different legal regime applies, and marine scientific research for data collecting activities of natural phenomena is based on the motivations for undertaking the activities. 46 The investigation activities conducted in relation to the Nord Stream project may be regarded as marine scientific research as they were not carried out for the purpose of economic utilisation of the natural phenomena, although their results can be relevant for the exploration or exploitation of natural resources.
Hence the question whether the submarine surveys were of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources (either living or non-living) is at the core of the dispute in terms of Article 246(5)(a) of the LOSC. Particularly due to the imprecise formulation of subparagraph (a), arguments in favour of both parties to the dispute may be found. However, the burden of proof lies with the coastal State. 47 At first glance the authorities of the coastal State have the discretionary right in interpreting the term 'direct significance ' . 48 Yet, on the contrary, the coastal State does not possess the right to determine whether a particular scientific research activity falls under the scope of the subparagraphs of 246(5): this determination has to be based on objective facts in accordance with Article 248 and 251 of the LOSC. 49 Hence, in occasions when the discretion may be exercised, it might fall short of legitimacy and thus constitute an abuse of rights in terms of Article 300 of the LOSC. The formulation 'direct significance' under Article 246(5)(a) of the LOSC has been generally understood to imply that:
[T]he results of the research in question must have their own, intrinsic value from the point of view of exploration or exploitation and that it is not enough that the research results are only remotely significant (eg, research results
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Koivurova and Pölönen (n 12) 313.
41 Vinogradov (n 6) 261. which can become useful from this point of view when they are combined with other data to be collected).
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Thus, scientific studies which can 'reasonably be expected to produce results permitting to locate resources, to assess them, or to monitor their status and availability for commercial exploitation' 51 and the significance of which is at least of some importance falls under the scope of Article 246(5)(a) of the LOSC. The decision whether a particular activity meets this threshold is often bound up with technical details and means of the investigation activity.
Significantly, under Article 264 and 297(2)(a) of the LOSC, disputes concerning marine scientific research are subject to an automatic exception to compulsory dispute settlement. 52 However, it has been argued that Russia could have used, under Article 297(2)(b) of the LOSC, its right to challenge the Estonian authorities' refusal in 2007 to grant the permit to conduct hydrographic surveys in its EEZ. 53 Yet, the fact that Russia failed to refer Estonia to compulsory conciliation may be regarded on the other hand as an indication of its tacit consent to the Estonian position. Notably, although in essence State parties to the LOSC are permitted under Annex V, Section 2 to the LOSC to refer such disputes to compulsory conciliation, the authoritative award of the conciliation is legally still non-binding. Marine scientific research is intertwined with environmental impact assessment as it provides the necessary data for its subsequent assessment. In the next chapter, the precedential Nord Stream project's EIA is scrutinised to better understand the role an EIA has in States' deliberations on whether to grant a permit for laying submarine pipelines in their EEZ. 
VIII. The applicable EIA procedure to the Nord Stream pipeline project

A. The relevant legal framework
Article
Biological Diversity and Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration 56 as non-binding instruments further reflect the customary nature of the obligation to undertake an EIA in circumstances where proposed activities are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment.
In line with the precautionary principle an EIA has to be carried out 'at an early stage and prior to decision' 57 in order to forestall a potential risk of an accident to occur. 58 Moreover, Article 206 of the LOSC does not include any obligations or further steps that States have to take subsequent to receiving the results of such assessments besides publishing the report in accordance with Article 205 of the LOSC. Yet, it is clear that under Article 194(1) of the LOSC States are required to take further action in occasions when the EIA indicates that the project has adverse effects in order to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment. Therefore, the Espoo Convention has a particular significance in providing the specific requirements that States have to fulfil in such circumstances in order to ensure that they do not act in breach of Part XII of the LOSC.
B. The EIA procedure under the Espoo Convention
Under the EIA regime of the Espoo Convention, the Nord Stream project has five parties of origin (Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany) and nine affected parties (including additionally Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). 64 Due to the complexity of the EIA procedure and the large number of affected parties and parties of origin, an innovative approach was adopted in connection with the Nord Stream project. Namely, by establishing the international coordination meetings (comprising of the representatives of all nine affected parties), they ensured that the Nord Stream consortium conducts an environmental impact statement for the entire Nord Stream pipeline in addition to the traditional assessment of the individual sectors on the basis of national EIA legislation. 65 The national Espoo contact points were responsible for ensuring that the assessment of the entire project fulfilled the minimum technical requirements of the Espoo Convention. State was in accordance with its national EIA legislation and the corresponding rules. 67 By February 2010 all five parties of origin had granted their final permission for the laying of the Nord Stream pipeline in their waters. 68 During the early stage of the national EIA procedures, the national authorities could have required the Nord Stream consortium to evaluate alternatives for implementing the Nord Stream pipeline under the jurisdiction of each coastal State. Yet, it is not a strict obligation to consider all locational alternatives as the Appendix II(b) of the Espoo Convention is limited to reasonable alternatives.
Thus, in accordance with the Espoo Convention, each party of origin has to determine which alternatives are to be examined within its jurisdiction, including land-based alternatives. 69 However, no such requests were made during the scoping phase of the assessment. Hence, subsequently it became difficult to argue for the States concerned that the environmental impact statement for the entire Nord Stream pipeline was incomplete because it did not take into account land-based alternatives. 70 Nevertheless, the European Parliament 71 and some of the affected States 72 criticised the transboundary EIA because the alternatives for the project's route were supposedly not studied sufficiently. Additionally, it has been pointed out that the origin parties could have asked the consortium in their meeting in April 2006 'to make a broader international study and comparison of alternatives between land-based and sea-based routing alternatives.' 73 Thus, it would have arguably been more in accordance with the object and purpose of Appendix II(b) of the Espoo Convention which states that reasonable alternatives to the proposed project have to be included in the EIA documentation.
As considered above, under the LOSC the Baltic Sea littoral States had the right to deny the permit for constructing a longdistance gas transmission pipeline in their EEZ or on their continental shelf. This chapter indicated that the decision of whether to grant such a permit was to a great extent related to the outcome of the relevant EIA procedures. The subsequent analysis is focused on the question of whether from the viewpoint of marine environmental protection it would have been reasonable for the concerned States to refuse to give their permission to the Nord Stream project in support of an alternative onshore route.
IX.
The prospect of a land-based alternative to the Nord Stream submarine pipeline in view of the principle of sustainable development and precautionary principle
A. The sensitiveness of the Baltic Sea marine environment
The Baltic Sea is the world's largest body of brackish water with a mean depth of 54 meters. 74 Due to its semi-enclosed nature, 75 shallow entrance in the Kattegat (23 metres) and a threshold depth in the deepest channel near the Swedish coast of merely 20 metres, 76 the complete renewal of water in the Baltic Sea takes 20-30 years. 77 These general factors, in combination with cold water, 78 are the main causes of the particular sensitiveness of the Baltic Sea marine environment. Due to its role as the final reservoir of pollution in the whole Baltic Sea catchment area where a population of about 85 million people live, 79 the state of the Baltic Sea has been described as disastrous. 80 Notably, however, its environmental situation has slightly improved in some fields. 
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In However, it is indicative of the applicability of Article 194(5) of the LOSC to the fragile ecosystem of the Baltic Sea as this provision may be regarded as the legal basis for PSSAs. 84 Numerous submarine pipelines have been laid in the North Sea, including so far the world's longest underwater pipeline Langeled, without a considerable discussion on environmental impacts. However, although the proponents of the Nord Stream make this analogy, in regard to the Nord Stream project the comparison is misleading for numerous ecological, hydrographical and geographical reasons which by-pass the fundamental differences between the two seas. 85 In addition to geographical factors, eg depth of the seas and openness to the Atlantic Ocean, various anthropogenic sources of pollutants have to be taken into consideration.
B. Anthropogenic sources of pollutants in the Baltic Sea in view of the impact of the Nord Stream pipeline on the marine environment
Article 1(1)(4) of the LOSC and Article 2 of the 1992 Helsinki Convention provide the definition for the pollution of the marine environment. Under its terms the Nord Stream pipeline introduces a variety of pollutants in the Baltic Sea.
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Significantly, the transboundary EIA conducted by the Nord Stream consortium has allegedly missed some fundamental information in that regard.
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The Nord Stream pipeline traverses main shipping routes of the Baltic Sea. 88 Yet, the actual pipeline is susceptible to damage from a ship's anchor or trawling nets resulting possibly with blowouts which may be explosive. 89 It has been noted that anchor damage and related accidents 90 have accounted for 90 per cent of the pollution related to pipelines.
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The scientific certainty regarding the behaviour of hydrocarbon gases in the natural waters and especially their impacts on water organisms, populations, and ecosystems is very limited. Thus, subsequent to accidental drilling blowouts in the Sea of Azov in 1982 and 1985, researchers found a causal effect between the release of large amounts of natural gas and mass fish mortality. 92 This implies that the precautionary principle should have particular significance in risk assessments in connection with projects such as the Nord Stream. The transboundary EIA conducted by the Nord Stream consortium, however, concluded that the issue is not problematic. Significantly, as the chemical warfare agents' containers corrode 107 a stable leakage occurs with mustard gas having the most extreme character on the marine environment. 108 The rate of its leakage peaks in about 125 years after dumping. 109 The long term effects of the chemical munitions dumped in the Baltic Sea are unknown and it is unclear whether these toxic substances might eventually find their way into the human food chain. 110 Although the prevailing opinion is that the catastrophe scenario with regard to the sudden emission of large quantities of chemical warfare agents is unlikely to occur, 111 it is evident that the stable and growing cumulative effect due to the corrosion of the chemical warfare agents' containers in next hundred years places a heavy burden on the marine environment of the Baltic Sea. 112 Moreover, it has been stressed that as a result of the hydrographical conditions in the Baltic Sea even 'a relatively small environmental change may cause severe unbalance to a whole ecosystem' 113 and hence 'additional stress by pollutants is of great importance to such an environment.'
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D.
The transboundary EIA and the final decision on the proposed activity in view of general principles of environmental law
Taking into account the former considerations, the Nord Stream pipeline raises a variety of questions in regard to its impact on the Baltic Sea. In the occasion of natural gas blowouts or leakages it would result in a cumulative and long-lasting adverse effect on the fragile marine environment. Moreover, once the pipeline starts leaking, its repair takes a long time since it is subject to certain actions, eg loading or diving that might also be affected by severe weather conditions.
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Therefore, it is striking that these considerations, by-passing precautionary principle 116 and ecosystem approach, 117 were neglected in the transboundary EIA. Hence it is questionable whether the transboundary EIA was conducted with 'prudence and caution ' 118 necessary 'to prevent serious harm' 119 and 'to avert further deterioration' 120 of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea, contradicting Article 3(2) of the 1992 Helsinki Convention.
The obligation to protect the large marine ecosystem 121 of the Baltic Sea, to conserve natural habitats and biological diversity, to protect ecological processes and to take all appropriate measures to promote the ecological restoration and the preservation of its ecological balance are set forth in Articles 3 (1) Furthermore, it is noted in Article 19(1) of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty that States should 'minimize in an economically efficient manner harmful Environmental Impacts'. In that respect it is notable that the land-based alternative through Latvia, Lithuania and Poland would have been only slightly longer or even shorter 122 in distance than the off-shore pipeline, cheaper 123 and less hazardous to the environment. Finally, the precedential transboundary EIA conducted by the Nord Stream consortium demonstrated the importance of including all reasonable alternatives, as provided in Appendix II(b) to the Espoo Convention, in the assessment in order to safeguard an indisputable acceptance to a proposed project. The present author maintains that in determining whether a particular alternative should be considered as reasonable and subject to Appendix II(b) of the Espoo Convention, the alternative's cost-effectiveness, the ecosystem approach, the precautionary principle and the principle of sustainable development may be regarded as the principal indicators. Based on these criteria and taking into account the sensitiveness of the Baltic Sea marine environment the land-based alternative of the Nord Stream submarine pipeline should have been included in the transboundary EIA documentation. 
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In strict terms it is not an obligation under Articles 6(1) and 6(2) of the Espoo Convention for the parties of origin to choose for the best environmental alternative. However, it is evident that due account of the outcome of the EIA procedure has to be taken in the final decision on the proposed activity. new concept, ie 'strategic element', in the EIA framework, which they claimed to be essential factor for conducting an EIA in cases of 'complex activities', eg large-scale energy projects concerning several countries. Accordingly, the strategic dimension comprises of elements such as geopolitical issues, economic, energy and climate policies, regional integration and relations between States which all have to be taken into consideration in the EIA documentation.
